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I. ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes undue influence in the South African law 
of wills in light of scholarly criticism of the testamentary undue 
influence doctrine in the United States. The article assesses in 
particular whether the so-called “undue influence paradox” 
identified in American scholarship is manifest in the South African 
law of wills: is testamentary undue influence’s role as guardian of 
testamentary freedom undermined by the judicial pursuit of family 
protectionism? The article proceeds, with due recognition of the 
differences between the American and South African legal 
traditions, from American scholars’ conceptualization of the 
paradox and their views on other complexities associated with the 
doctrine, to an exposition on the conceptualization, the statutory 
regulation, and the judicial utilization of testamentary undue 
influence in South Africa. The article determines whether or not 
the South African legal position conforms to some or all of the 
assertions made with regard to the undue influence paradox and 
further complexities associated with the testamentary undue 
influence doctrine in the American context. The article provides a 
mixed jurisdiction’s response to the call for the abolition of the 
testamentary undue influence doctrine in recent scholarship from 
the United States. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Jurisdictions that acknowledge freedom of testamentary 
disposition recognize generally that a will or testamentary bequest 
is invalid if it was obtained through influence that destroyed the 
testator’s free agency and substituted the testator’s dispositive 
preferences with those of another. The aforementioned constitutes 
the usual test for testamentary undue influence in such 
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jurisdictions.1 Over the past two decades scholars from the United 
States have voiced various concerns regarding the testamentary 
undue influence doctrine’s operation in the American context. 
While some American commentators support the doctrine,2 a 
number of others have criticized it and called for reform,3 with at 
least one demanding that the doctrine be abolished in the United 
States.4 
The South African law of wills, which is a branch of the law of 
successions, acknowledges that undue influence invalidates a will 
or testamentary bequest. However, neither South African case law 
nor South African scholarly texts on succession law typify 
testamentary undue influence as an independent legal doctrine in 
the South African legal system. In fact, Scholtens,5 in his analysis 
of undue influence in Roman-Dutch law—the civil law component 
of South Africa’s common law to this day—concludes that apart 
from the restricted doctrine of metus reverentialis (fear by reason 
of awe, respect or deference) a general doctrine of undue influence 
was not part of Roman-Dutch law. 
Notwithstanding differences between the South African and 
American positions on testamentary undue influence at a doctrinal 
level, both legal systems acknowledge that destruction of a 
testator’s free agency and displacement of testamentary intent 
constitute grounds for the invalidation of a will or testamentary 
bequest. Moreover, both systems have a history of judicial 
 1. E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent 
Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture 
Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 279 (1999). 
 2. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Frolik, The Strange Interplay of Testamentary 
Capacity and the Doctrine of Undue Influence: Are We Protecting Older 
Testators or Overriding Individual Preference?, 24 INT’L J. L. & PSYCH. 253 
(2001). 
 3. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 571 (1997); Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for 
Testamentary Freedom, 42 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 129 (2008).  
 4. Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence 
Should Be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245 (2010). 
 5. J.E. Scholtens, Undue Influence, ACTA JURIDICA 276, 287 (1960). 
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engagement with these principles. It is submitted, therefore, that an 
instructive comparative analysis on testamentary undue influence 
is possible despite dogmatic differences between the South African 
and American jurisdictions. 
South African scholars generally regard testamentary undue 
influence as a benign construct that protects the testamentary 
freedom of particularly aged or otherwise vulnerable testators 
against the importunities of false persuaders or enterprising 
impostors.6 However, South African judgments in which 
testamentary undue influence was found to have been present are 
few and far between. Can this dearth of South African cases be 
explained by reflecting on the criticism of the testamentary undue 
influence doctrine in the American context? Do aspects of South 
African testamentary undue influence judgments conform to the 
assertions made by critics of the doctrine in regard to its 
problematic, unorthodox and paradoxical operation in the United 
States? Are these assertions appropriate to the South African 
legislature’s treatment of testamentary undue influence? Insofar as 
American scholarly critique of the doctrine can be distilled into 
general themes unconfined by jurisdictional or doctrinal 
peculiarities, is the South African legal position on testamentary 
undue influence, when measured against such a critical thematic 
perspective, satisfactory, or in need of reform? Can South Africa 
learn some lessons from the criticism of the testamentary undue 
influence doctrine in the United States? 
This article attempts to answer these questions. The case 
against testamentary undue influence, as presented in American 
scholarship, is analyzed first. In particular, the so-called “undue 
influence paradox” that negates the traditional view of undue 
influence as protective of testamentary freedom is outlined. Other 
 6. See, e.g., Jean C. Sonnekus, Freedom of Testation and the Ageing 
Testator in EXPLORING THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: STUDIES NATIONAL, 
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 78 (Kenneth G.C. Reid, Marius J. De Waal & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Edinburgh Univ. Press 2007). 
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complexities associated with testamentary undue influence raised 
by American commentators are also highlighted, particularly 
insofar as these complexities reinforce the paradox. Second, and in 
light of the centrality of family protectionism in the criticism 
leveled at the American doctrine, aspects of familial solidarity in 
South African inheritance law are outlined. Third, the South 
African legal position on testamentary undue influence is 
contextualized. It is shown that English law influenced its 
reception and development in South Africa, but that the South 
African law on testamentary undue influence is rooted, by and 
large, in the civil law, particularly Roman-Dutch law. Fourth, an 
investigation is undertaken to determine whether the undue 
influence paradox, or aspects thereof, and some of the American 
doctrine’s associated complexities, are manifest in the South 
African law of wills. To this end, the South African legislature’s 
engagement with testamentary undue influence, as well as South 
African courts’ utilization of testamentary undue influence, is 
investigated. The article concludes with an assessment, in light of 
calls for abolition of the doctrine in American scholarship, of the 
need for reformative measures regarding the South African legal 
position on testamentary undue influence. 
III. TESTAMENTARY UNDUE INFLUENCE: CRITICISM OF THE 
DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The “Undue Influence Paradox” 
Conventional wisdom casts testamentary undue influence in 
the role of guardian of freedom of testation through the 
invalidation of wills or testamentary bequests when the testator’s 
will is substituted with that of the person who exercised the 
influence. Madoff calls this the “dominant paradigm” of undue 
influence in the United States; within this paradigm, undue 
influence is related to, but distinct from, fraud and duress insofar 
as all three doctrines protect testators’ rights to dispose freely of 
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their property.7 She contends that courts, when invoking the 
doctrine, invariably do so “with strong rhetoric in support of 
freedom of testation.”8 Paradoxically, according to Madoff, the 
doctrine can, and frequently does, occasion a disregard of testators’ 
freedom of testation when it is judicially utilized in an unorthodox 
manner to quash testamentary dispositions. This occurs despite 
ample evidence that such dispositions represent the testators’ true 
wishes.9 
What causes the undue influence paradox? Some American 
commentators advance judicial pursuit of family protectionism as a 
principal reason. Courts seek to ensure, ostensibly for the greater 
social good, that wealth will remain within the testators’ biological 
family, thus protecting, in particular, intestate heirs against 
disinheritance. According to this view, a judge or jury will favor, 
for example, an estranged child’s argument that a will, in which 
her father instituted as sole heir a caring remote blood relative or a 
non-consanguineous relation (such as a supportive neighbor or 
helpful friend), is the product of undue influence exercised by an 
unscrupulous legacy hunter on a vulnerable testator. Invalidation 
of such a will on the ground of undue influence secures the child’s 
intestate inheritance and satisfies society’s normative insistence on 
wealth transfer upon death between (close) consanguineous 
relatives. The testator’s probable intention to benefit the remote 
relative, neighbor or friend, so the argument goes, is effectively 
negated by a finding that the act of testation was a product of 
undue influence.10 
 7. Madoff, supra note 3, at 575-76, 578. See also Leslie, supra note 3, at 
244; Ronald J. Scalise, Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative 
Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 41, 54-55 (2008). 
 8. Madoff, supra note 3, at 581. 
 9. Id. at 601. See also Leslie, supra note 3, at 236-37. 
 10. Leslie, supra note 3, at 236-37; Madoff, supra note 3, at 576-77; Spitko, 
supra note 1, at 280; Scalise, supra note 7, at 55, 101; Spivack, supra note 4, at 
246; Tate, supra note 3, at 143. Even supporters of the doctrine concede that it 
permits significant leeway for courts to supplant testamentary directions: see, 
e.g., Frolik, supra note 2, at 261, who admits that the doctrine allows a court to 
substitute its opinion of the reasonableness of a dispositive plan for that of the 
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Madoff illustrates the existence of the paradox through a 
comparison between two American jurisdictions.11 The first 
jurisdiction, Georgia, affords no statutory protection against 
disinheritance of spouses; the other, Louisiana, not only provides 
statutory protection against spousal disinheritance, but also 
protects children against disinheritance through a statutorily 
imposed legitime. Madoff’s analysis of undue influence judgments 
from these two states shows that a will in which a testator 
disinherited a spouse and children is much more likely to be 
invalidated on the ground of undue influence by courts in Georgia 
than by their counterparts in Louisiana. Madoff asserts that these 
judicial tendencies are indicative of a strong correlation between 
the existence of family protection devices, on the one hand, and the 
application of the undue influence doctrine, on the other. She 
concludes that the doctrine’s dominant purpose is not to protect 
testators’ autonomy, but rather to protect testators’ families against 
disinheritance.12 
Interestingly, Madoff,13 and some of the doctrine’s other 
critics,14 acknowledge the fundamental changes in patterns of 
family wealth transmission in the twentieth century described by 
Langbein in his seminal article on the topic.15 Langbein shows, 
among other things, that traditional wealth transmission from 
parents to children through the latter’s inheritance of the farm or 
firm was supplanted gradually in the twentieth century by parents’ 
investment in human capital. Inter vivos wealth transfer to ensure 
that children are well-educated and enjoy a good start in life has 
testator; moreover, that wills failing to provide for spouses and close blood 
relatives, and for equal divisions among children, are most vulnerable to judicial 
invalidation on the ground of undue influence. 
 11. Madoff, supra note 3, at 611-19. 
 12. Id. at 612. 
 13. Id. at 625-29. 
 14. E.g., Tate, supra note 3, at 163-66. 
 15. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth 
Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988). 
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become the modern trend in intergenerational wealth transfer.16 
This phenomenon occasions significant consumption of wealth 
during the parents’ lifetimes, leaving children with less of an 
expectation that they will inherit from their parents upon their 
death.17 Notwithstanding this change in wealth transmission 
practices, many critics of the testamentary undue influence 
doctrine in America advocate for the introduction of measures to 
retain wealth within families upon death, either through instituting 
typically civilian forced heirship devices, or by recognizing 
judicial discretion to order family maintenance. They argue that 
such measures will alleviate pressure on courts to use the 
testamentary undue influence doctrine to attain the goal of family 
protectionism. 
Spivack, who argues for the abolition of the doctrine, is a 
proponent of this approach: 
The unsatisfactory doctrine of undue influence challenges 
us to decide what we, as a society, care about. If we care 
about protecting families, let legislatures institute forced 
heirship. If we value testamentary freedom over protecting 
families, let courts give it effect. 18 
Scalise similarly advocates that the greater and more 
significant a legal system’s family protective scheme is, the less 
necessary a doctrine such as undue influence becomes.19 In this 
light, it is interesting that in the Netherlands, a typical civilian 
jurisdiction with extensive forced heirship devices, a frequently-
advanced argument for retaining imperative inheritance law 
focuses on the adverse consequences that follow from a parent 
disinheriting, under undue influence, his children in favor of 
outsiders.20 The potency of this argument is, however, suspect by 
 16. Id. at 723. 
 17. Id. at 740-43. 
 18. Spivack, supra note 4, at 246. 
 19. Scalise, supra note 7, at 81. 
 20. Martin Jan A. Van Mourik, Perspective 5: Comparative Law—the 
Netherlands in IMPERATIVE INHERITANCE LAW IN A LATE-MODERN SOCIETY 
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reason of the Dutch Civil Code’s prescripts aimed specifically at 
eliminating opportunities for testamentary undue influence.21 
It is nevertheless understandable that forced heirship, along the 
lines decreed in the civil codes of many continental European 
jurisdictions,22 appears attractive to American scholars as a cure 
for the perceived unorthodox judicial utilization of the undue 
influence doctrine in order to accomplish familial economic 
protectionism. This is because the introduction of imperative 
inheritance law will constitute a novel addition to the American 
legal tradition, with its roots in the English common law (with the 
exception of Louisiana, a typically mixed jurisdiction, where a 
legitime protects children’s inheritance rights). It must be noted, 
however, that forced heirship has come under increased criticism 
in contemporary scholarship from civil law jurisdictions, primarily 
because of its inflexibility and consequent inability to respond in a 
refined manner to changing socio-economic realities. Castelein, for 
example, criticizes mandatory succession in continental European 
jurisdictions for the constraints it imposes on the freedom to 
dispose of property, as well as for its limiting effect on human self-
107, 111 (Christoph Castelein, René Foqué & Alain Verbeke eds., Intersentia 
2009). 
 21. Id. The Code’s Book 4 on inheritance law prescribes that a testator 
cannot make a testamentary disposition in favor of, among others, any 
professional in the field of individual healthcare who attended to the testator 
during the time of the illness that resulted in death as well as those who provided 
mental care and support to the testator during that time (art. 4:59), nor in favor 
of caregivers and nurses at institutions for elders or institutions for those who 
suffer from mental disorders (in respect of wills made during a stay at such 
institutions) (art. 4:59). Such dispositions are, however, not void but only 
voidable in favor of those invoking a ground for nullification (art. 4:62). The 
aforementioned prohibitions are aimed at negating undue influence occasioned 
by the relationship between a testator and the indicated persons: see F.W.J.M. 
Schols, Wie Uiterste Wilsbeschikkingen Kunnen Maken en Wie Daaruit 
Voordeel Kunnen Genieten, in HANDBOEK ERFRECHT 248 (M.J.A. Van Mourik 
ed., Kluwer 2011). 
 22. Spivack, supra note 4, at 305-306. 
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development.23 This criticism suggests that imperative inheritance 
law is, arguably, an imperfect solution to the demand for economic 
protectionism in the family context. The South African experience, 
among others, suggests that Spivack’s alternative proposal, namely 
the override of wills through a family maintenance order,24 is a 
more effective way of achieving such a goal.25 
B. Associated Complexities 
A number of other factors that complicate the testamentary 
undue influence doctrine in the American context are evident from 
the scholarship under discussion. Spivack argues that the 
evidentiary difficulties associated with the doctrine are among 
these factors.26 Averments of undue influence are invariably 
adjudicated on circumstantial evidence because the person whose 
state of mind is at issue is dead at the time of the inquiry.27 
Therefore, the success of a challenge to a will’s validity on the 
ground of undue influence depends largely on whether the party 
bearing the burden of proof can establish or refute the existence of 
undue influence. American jurisdictions generally permit burden-
shifting in the course of an undue influence inquiry: initially the 
onus rests on the party who alleges undue influence, but if this 
party can raise a presumption of undue influence, the burden shifts 
to the will’s proponent to disprove the existence of undue 
influence. In some American jurisdictions, a will’s challenger 
needs to show no more than the existence of a confidential 
relationship between the testator and the alleged influencer in order 
to raise a presumption of undue influence.28 Therefore, it is 
 23. Christoph Castelein, Introduction and Objectives in IMPERATIVE 
INHERITANCE LAW IN A LATE-MODERN SOCIETY 1, 38 (Christoph Castelein, 
René Foqué & Alain Verbeke eds., Intersentia 2009). 
 24. Spivack, supra note 4, at 305. 
 25. See infra, Part IV.A on the South African position. 
 26. Spivak, supra note 4, at 263-65. 
 27. Madoff, supra note 3, at 582. 
 28. Id. at 583. See also Leslie, supra note 3, at 245, 253; Spivack, supra 
note 4, at 263; Tate, supra note 3, at 190. 
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relatively easy in those jurisdictions for a will’s challenger to effect 
burden-shifting, particularly if the bequest that the testator is 
alleged to have made under undue influence does not take the form 
of a so-called “natural bequest.”29 Madoff argues that the undue 
influence paradox is rendered more pronounced by the 
“confidential relationship/natural bequest dichotomy.”30 She 
explains that, on the one hand, the existence of a confidential 
relationship between the testator and alleged influencer is often 
sufficient to raise the presumption of undue influence. If, on the 
other hand, the will contains a “natural bequest”—one in which, 
typically, the whole or the greatest portion of the deceased’s estate 
is bequeathed to the testator’s spouse and/or (close) blood 
relatives—it generally serves, notwithstanding a confidential 
relationship between the parties concerned, as a strong indicator 
that the testator’s will was not displaced by that of the alleged 
influencer.31 
Some American scholars are even skeptical of a judicial 
inquiry into the displacement of a testator’s will by that of 
someone else. Scalise acknowledges that the concept of undue 
influence is notoriously difficult, but bemoans the fact that it has 
frequently degenerated into “nothing more than platitudes about 
‘substituting one’s volition for another’ and generalities 
concerning whether a testator is ‘susceptible’ to a kind of influence 
considered ‘undue’ by the law.”32 Spivack questions whether, 
given the psychology and relational power dynamics at play, 
judges or juries are best suited to be adjudicators of undue 
influence.33 She argues that testamentary capacity (or the lack 
thereof) is much easier to prove than undue influence34 and, 
 29. Madoff, supra note 3, at 602. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Madoff, supra note 3, at 602, 607. 
 32. Scalise, supra note 7, at 43. 
 33. Spivack, supra note 4, at 268-76. 
 34. See also, Madoff, supra note 3, at 574, who states that lack of mental 
capacity and undue influence are the most frequent grounds for invalidating 
wills in America. 
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because the two doctrines are closely related, many challenges of 
wills can be resolved if decided on capacity alone, without the 
need for adjudication on undue influence. Spivack favors ante 
mortem capacity determinations to prevent spurious and vexatious 
challenges of wills on capacity grounds.35 Moreover, she regards 
the few cases that would not be brought before a court if the undue 
influence doctrine were abolished in America as not constituting 
sufficient harm to justify the doctrine’s continued existence in the 
American context.36 
Frolik opines that the judicial preference for finding undue 
influence, rather than declaring a will invalid for want of 
testamentary capacity, can be explained by judicial reluctance to 
raise the level of capacity that is required to make a will.37 He 
contends that disqualifying wills with questionable dispositive 
provisions on the ground of testators’ incapacity will seriously 
erode freedom of testation.38 Frolik, therefore, supports the 
testamentary undue influence doctrine because it permits courts to 
protect vulnerable testators by creating a middle-ground between 
testamentary capacity and incapacity; one where a testator 
possesses marginal capacity that renders will-making possible, but 
leaves the testator, potentially at least, open to undue influence.39 
Spivack disagrees, contending that the level of capacity required to 
make a will is generally extremely low (compared to, for example, 
the capacity required for concluding a contract) and that this 
suggests that a “safety valve of undue influence” is not required—
once minimal capacity has been shown to exist, the testator’s 
dispositive preferences must prevail.40 
 
 35. Spivack, supra note 4, at 291. See also Tate, supra note 3, at 144. 
 36. Spivack, supra note 4, at 307-308. 
 37. Frolik, supra note 2, at 264. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 265. See also Scalise, supra note 7, at 75. 
 40. Spivack, supra note 4, at 292-93. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
2013] UNDUE INFLUENCE 521 
 
IV. THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION  
A. Family Protectionism in South African Inheritance Law 
American scholarly critique of the testamentary undue 
influence doctrine, highlighted in the foregoing part of this article, 
advances American jurisdictions’ general dearth of devices that 
safeguard wealth retention for a testator’s close consanguineous 
relatives, and the consequent judicial pursuit of such wealth 
retention through the testamentary undue influence doctrine at the 
expense of testamentary freedom, as foundational to the undue 
influence paradox. In light of these opinions on the 
interrelationship between the undue influence doctrine and familial 
wealth retention in the American context, a brief exposition on 
economic familial solidarity in South African inheritance law is 
apposite. 
Family protectionism features in numerous common law 
constructs of South African inheritance law.41 More pertinent to 
this article, however, is the South African legal position on 
imperative inheritance and the provision of family maintenance. 
Forced heirship was part of Roman-Dutch law introduced by 
Dutch settlers at the Cape of Good Hope (present-day Cape Town) 
from the middle of the seventeenth century.42 However, all 
manifestations of compulsory succession, such as the legitimate 
 41. E.g., a general presumption, founded thereon that a parent is deemed not 
to intend the disinheritance of children in favor of remoter relatives or outsiders, 
operates against disinheritance and in favor of equal treatment of children in 
parents’ testamentary dispositions; the duty of collation (collatio bonorum), 
based on the presumption that a parent or grandparent intends an equal division 
of assets among children and further descendants, is imposed on a deceased’s 
descendants to account to the estate for certain gifts or advances received from, 
or debts incurred to, the ascendant during the latter’s lifetime; and one of the 
principles that governs implied fideicommissa states that a gift-over from a 
testator’s descendant to a third person is regarded as being subject to an implied 
condition of si sine liberis decesserit—that the descendant left no issue. This 
implied condition is founded on the notion that a testator would not pass over 
grandchildren (or other descendants) in favor of remoter beneficiaries. 
 42. N.J. VAN DER MERWE & C.J. ROWLAND, DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE 
ERFREG, 616 (6th ed., J.P. van der Walt 1990). See infra Part IV.B on Roman-
Dutch law as part of South Africa’s common law. 
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portion, the Lex hac edictali, as well as the Falcidian and 
Trebellian fourths, were abolished by statute under English 
influence in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.43 Modern South African law is, therefore, devoid of the 
typical Romanist-Continental forced heirship devices.44 
South African law nevertheless recognizes that a person’s 
indigent minor child, whether born in or out of wedlock, has a 
common law claim for maintenance against that person’s estate.45 
This claim is secondary to those of estate creditors, but is preferred 
to the claims of legatees and heirs.46 An adult child in need of 
maintenance can also bring such a claim.47 A child’s maintenance 
claim against a deceased parent’s estate is lodged, along with all 
other charges on the estate, with the estate’s executor and does not 
require judicial confirmation. 
A deceased’s indigent surviving spouse enjoys a statutory 
maintenance claim under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act 27 of 1990. This claim, also lodged with the executor, is for 
the provision of the surviving spouse’s reasonable maintenance 
needs until death or remarriage, insofar as the spouse is unable to 
provide for such needs from his or her own means and earnings.48 
The traditional meaning attributed to “survivor” for the purpose 
of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act, namely that of the 
surviving spouse to a valid civil marriage concluded under the 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961, has been broadened by South African 
courts under constitutional direction. This meaning now includes 
the surviving spouse of a de facto monogamous unrecognized 
 43. Act 23 of 1874 (Cape); Law 7 of 1885 (Natal); Proc 28 of 1902 
(Transvaal); Law Book of 1902 (Orange Free State). 
 44. M.M. CORBETT, H.R. HAHLO, GYS HOFMEYR & ELLISON KAHN, THE 
LAW OF SUCCESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 34 (1st ed., Juta 1980). 
 45. Carelse v. Estate De Vries (1906) 23 SC 532; Glazer v. Glazer 1963 (4) 
SA 694 (A). 
 46. Ex parte Zietsman: In re Estate Barnard 1952 (2) SA 16 (C). 
 47. Hoffmann v. Herdan 1982 (2) SA 274 (T). 
 48. Art. 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
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Muslim marriage;49 the surviving spouse or spouses of a valid 
customary law marriage concluded by Black South Africans either 
under customary law or under the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act 120 of 1998;50 and each surviving spouse of an 
unrecognized polygynous Muslim marriage.51 The South African 
Constitutional Court nevertheless refused extension of such a claim 
to the surviving partner of a permanent heterosexual life-
partnership.52 However, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 provides 
that the legal consequences of a marriage as contemplated in the 
Marriage Act apply to all civil unions. The Civil Union Act 
provides further that any reference to “marriage” in any other law, 
including the common law, includes a civil union, and that 
“husband,” “wife” or “spouse” in any other law, including the 
common law, includes a civil union partner.53 Consequently, a 
surviving civil union partner, whether heterosexual or of the same 
sex, fully enjoys the benefits of the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act. 
In light of the foregoing, De Waal is correct when he lists, in 
his analysis of the socio-economic underpinnings of South African 
inheritance law, the support of the family as one of the basic 
functions of the law of succession. De Waal explains that socially-
based restrictions on freedom of testation, such as the 
aforementioned rules on family maintenance, serve to attain this 
goal.54 The question arises whether the principles regarding 
testamentary undue influence—in conformity with the undue 
influence paradox as described in American scholarship—function 
as a (further) socially-based restriction on testamentary freedom in 
 49. Daniels v. Campbell 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC). 
 50. Kambule v. The Master 2007 (3) SA 403 (E); Reform of Customary 
Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 (Sch.). 
 51. Hassam v. Jacobs [2008] 4 All SA 350 (C). 
 52. Volks v. Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
 53. Art. 13 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
 54. M.J. de Waal, The Social and Economic Foundations of the Law of 
Succession, 8 STELL. L. REV. 164, 170-71 (1997). See also, generally, François 
du Toit, The Constitutional Family in the Law of Succession, 126 S. AFRICAN L. 
J. 463 (2009). 
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South Africa. Does economic family protectionism underpin 
statutory engagement with, and judicial utilization of, testamentary 
undue influence in South African law? Next, before these 
questions are addressed, the conceptualization of undue influence 
in the South African law of wills will be explained. 
B. The Conceptualization of Testamentary Undue Influence in 
South Africa 
The South African legal system can best be described as mixed 
or hybrid in nature. It originated as an outgrowth of the interplay 
between Roman-Dutch and English common law legal traditions. 
Roman-Dutch law is a legal system which was developed in the 
Netherlands in the latter part of the fifteenth, through the sixteenth 
and into the seventeenth centuries. It is the product of the reception 
of Roman law and its synthesis with Germanic customary law, 
feudal law and canon law, and it was introduced to South Africa at 
the Cape of Good Hope by Dutch settlers in the seventeenth 
century. Roman-Dutch law remains part of South Africa’s law to 
this day. However, it no longer exists in its pure form because of 
extensive judicial and legislative adaptation and development. In 
the aftermath of the second British occupation of the Cape in 1806, 
the ideas from the English system began to affect Roman-Dutch 
law. The new English rulers retained Roman-Dutch law, but 
English legal influence on the existing civilian legal system was 
unavoidable.55 The convergence of Roman-Dutch law and English 
law is particularly manifest in South African inheritance law, 
especially its law of wills. Formal aspects of wills, especially their 
execution, are regulated statutorily in the Wills Act 7 of 1953,56 
 55. For a concise overview of the development of South Africa’s common 
law and its mixed legal system, see A.B. EDWARDS, THE HISTORY OF SOUTH 
AFRICAN LAW—AN OUTLINE (LexisNexis South Africa 1996); Reinhard 
Zimmermann & Daniel Visser, Introduction: South African Law as a Mixed 
Legal System, in SOUTHERN CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 2 (R. Zimmermann & D. Visser eds., Clarendon Press 1996). 
 56. The Act commenced on 1 January 1954, but was subsequently amended 
on a number of occasions. The most significant recent amendment of the Wills 
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which takes its prescripts largely from legislation that mirrored the 
English Wills Act of 1837. On the other hand, the majority of 
typical testamentary institutions and constructs encountered in 
modern South African wills (such as the fideicommissum, the 
modus, and the right of accrual (ius accrescendi)) originated in 
Roman law and were received as such into Roman-Dutch law and 
ultimately into South African law.57 
Freedom of testation is a foundational principle of South 
African testate succession, and relatively few impediments restrict 
testators’ dispositive caprice.58 The principles pertaining to 
testamentary undue influence, ostensibly designed to foster free 
expression of testamentary wishes, are part of the South African 
law of wills. 
Considering English influence that pervaded the law after 
1806, it is unsurprising that early South African jurisprudence on 
testamentary undue influence relied greatly on English legal 
authority. In Finucane v. MacDonald,59 for example, the court 
opined that the South African legal position on testamentary undue 
influence accords with that espoused in the leading English case of 
Craig v. Lamoureux.60 Even earlier, in one of the first South 
African judgments to find testamentary undue influence, Executors 
of Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire,61 the court cited the English case of 
Parfitt v. Lawless62 in support of its findings that the burden of 
Act occurred in 1992 through the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of 
1992, which commenced on 1 October 1992. 
 57. For a concise overview of the hybrid nature of the South African law of 
wills, see François du Toit, Succession Law in South Africa – A Historical 
Perspective in EXPLORING THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: STUDIES NATIONAL, 
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 67 (Kenneth G.C. Reid, Marius J. De Waal & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Edinburgh University Press 2007). 
 58. M.M. CORBETT ET AL., THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 40 
(2d ed., Juta Law 2001), who contend that South African law takes “the 
principle of freedom of testation further than any other Western legal system.” 
 59. Finucane v. MacDonald 1942 CPD 19 33-34. 
 60. Craig v. Lamoureux 1920 AC 349. 
 61. Executors of Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire 1873 Buch 47. 
 62. Parfitt v. Lawless (1872) LR 2 P&D 462. 
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proof must be borne by the party asserting undue influence, and 
that no presumption of undue influence arises on the basis of the 
relationship between the parties.63 
In light of this reliance on English authority, it is equally 
unsurprising that South African courts initially conceptualized 
testamentary undue influence, in accordance with the then-
prevailing view in English law, as a manifestation of force or 
coercion.64 In Taylor v. Pim,65 for example, the court cited the 
English case of Wingrove v. Wingrove,66 where it was said that, to 
establish undue influence, it must be shown that “the will of the 
testator was coerced into doing that which he did not desire to 
do.”67 Engagement with Roman-Dutch authority on testamentary 
undue influence is conspicuously absent from the Finucane, 
Cerfonteyn and Taylor judgments. 
Later South African cases moved away from coercion as the 
hallmark of testamentary undue influence and embraced the notion 
of substituted volition, although not forsaking entirely the interplay 
between undue influence and coercion. In Spies v. Smith,68 the 
locus classicus of testamentary undue influence in South Africa, 
the court said: 
[A] last will may in fact be declared invalid if the testator 
has been moved by artifices of such a nature that they may 
be equated by reason of their effect to the exercise of 
coercion or fraud to make a bequest which he would not 
otherwise have made and which therefore expresses 
another person’s will rather than his own. In such a case 
one is not dealing with the authentic wishes of the testator 
but with a displacement of volition and the will is thus not 
upheld.69 
 63. Cerfonteyn, supra note 61, at 72. See also Tregea v. Godart 1939 AD 16 
22. 
 64. See, e.g., Cerfonteyn, supra note 61, at 72, 78. 
 65. Taylor v. Pim (1903) 24 NLR 484. 
 66. Wingrove v. Wingrove (1885) 11 PD 81. 
 67. Taylor, supra note 65, at 490. 
 68. Spies v. Smith 1957 (1) SA 539 (A). 
 69. Id. at 547 (translation from the original Afrikaans taken from M.J. DE 
WAAL & M.C. SCHOEMAN-MALAN, LAW OF SUCCESSION 44 (4th ed. Juta 2008). 
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A feature of the Spies case is the court’s contextualization of 
undue influence within South Africa’s Romanist-Civilian common 
law, and thus its break from earlier judicial reliance on English 
authority to resolve undue influence challenges to wills. The court 
made note of Roman-Dutch legal scholars’ insistence that “the pen 
of the dying must be free” and that it is contra bonos mores to 
deprive a testator of this freedom.70 However, these scholars 
acknowledged that not all interferences with expressions of 
testamentary intent occasion nullity—the interference must have 
negated a testator’s volition and caused the making of a will 
contrary to the testator’s intent.71 The scholars used the typical 
examples of severely ill or dying testators whose resistance to 
influence is easily overcome by reason of their physical and/or 
mental infirmity. The Spies court recognized, therefore, that the 
relationship between the parties is not the only factor to be 
considered in an undue influence inquiry, but that the mental 
ability of the testator, as well as the time that elapsed between the 
making of the disputed will and the testator’s death, are also 
matters pertinent to such an inquiry.72 
The court emphasized in Spies v. Smith that the mere existence 
of a relationship between the testator and the alleged influencer 
that could occasion, for example, metus reverentialis does not give 
rise to a presumption of displacement of volition. This is because 
cum sola potentia metum non arguat (power alone does not prove 
fear)—a will’s challenger bears the onus throughout, and each 
instance must be decided on the particular facts at hand.73 
This finding in Spies v. Smith was confirmed in two 
commentaries on undue influence in Roman-Dutch law published 
by South African scholars in the judgment’s aftermath. First, 
 70. Spies, supra note 68, at 545-46, relying on JOHANNES VOET, 
COMMENTARIUS AD PANDECTAS 29.6.1 (1698-1704) and CORNELIUS VAN 
BIJNKERSHOEK, DE CAPTATORIIS INSTITUTIONIBUS Ch. 10 (1743). 
 71. Spies, supra note 68, at 547. 
 72. Id. at 547-48. 
 73. Id. 
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Scholtens concluded that, although a leading legal scholar such as 
Johannes Voet recognized that undue influence invalidates a will, a 
general doctrine of undue influence (aside from a restricted 
doctrine of metus reverentialis) was not part of pure Roman-Dutch 
law.74 Joubert went even further and found that “metus 
reverentialis was never in itself a sufficient ground for attacking 
the validity of a legal act”75—insofar as the legal scholars 
acknowledged metus reverentialis as a ground for nullifying a will, 
it was “always with the qualification that the law does not 
recognize any presumption of improper action because of any 
special relationship existing between the parties.”76 
Notwithstanding undue influence’s (and, possibly, metus 
reverentialis’s) lack of doctrinal status in Roman-Dutch law, the 
conceptualization of testamentary undue influence in Spies v. 
Smith and subsequent academic commentaries provides strong 
support for the assertion that its role in South African law is prima 
facie to protect testamentary freedom by invalidating testamentary 
dispositions where the testator’s will was substituted for that of the 
influencer. In light of South African inheritance law’s firm stance 
in favor of family protectionism,77 this assertion raises the 
question: is testamentary undue influence, despite its 
aforementioned role, primarily applied in the South African 
context to retain familial wealth and, in so doing, to safeguard the 
testator’s biological family, particularly those who stand to inherit 
on intestacy, from disinheritance? Is the undue influence paradox 
and complexities associated with the American doctrine also 
manifest in the South African law of wills? These questions will be 
addressed in the article’s next two parts through a consideration of, 
first, the single provision dealing with undue influence contained 
 74. Scholtens, supra note 5, at 287. 
 75. D.J. Joubert, Some Aspects of Metus Reverentialis, 87 S. AFRICAN L. J. 
94, 98 (1970). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See supra Part IV.A. 
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in the South African Wills Act and, second, the engagement of 
South African courts with testamentary undue influence. 
C. Undue Influence and the South African Wills Act 
The South African Wills Act regulates testamentary capacity.78 
Testamentary undue influence, on the other hand, is governed, for 
the greater part, by the South African common law. 
Article 4A(1) of the Wills Act, imported through the Law of 
Succession Amendment Act,79 nevertheless disqualifies certain 
persons who participated in the making or execution of a will from 
benefiting under that will. People who witnessed a will, or who 
signed a will as a testator’s amanuensis, or who wrote a will or any 
part thereof in their own handwriting, and the person who was the 
spouse of any of the aforementioned people at the time of the 
will’s execution, are so disqualified. This prescript is not novel to 
the Wills Act. Article 4A(1) replaced the Act’s former 
disqualification provisions contained in the now-repealed articles 5 
and 6. These two articles prohibited a witness, an amanuensis, the 
spouse of a witness or amanuensis, or any person claiming under a 
witness, amanuensis or their spouse, from benefiting under the 
particular will, or from being nominated as testamentary executor, 
administrator, trustee or guardian in that will. Significantly, the 
South African Law Commission (as it was formerly called80), in its 
report that preceded the Law of Succession Amendment Act,81 
recommended that the disqualifications contained in the 
aforementioned articles 5 and 6 be abolished. The legislature 
 78. Art. 4 of the Act prescribes that every person of the age of sixteen years 
or older may make a will unless such person is, at the time of making the will, 
mentally incapable of appreciating the nature and effect of will-making; 
moreover, that the burden of proof in respect of mental incapacity rests on the 
person alleging the same. 
 79. Art. 4A was inserted into the Wills Act by art. 7 of the Law of 
Succession Amendment Act. 
 80. The Commission is now called the South African Law Reform 
Commission. 
 81. PROJECT 22, Reform of the Law of Succession, June 1991, 93-94. 
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rejected this recommendation, and retained these disqualifications, 
in amended form, under article 4A, to effect disqualification from 
testamentary benefit of the designated persons who participated in 
the making or execution of a will. 
Article 4A(1) is aimed at preventing fraud and undue 
influence; this is apparent from article 4A(2)(a), which stipulates 
that the High Court may order that any person who is disqualified 
under article 4A(1) is nevertheless competent to receive a benefit 
from the will concerned if the court is satisfied that such person did 
not defraud or unduly influence the testator in the execution of the 
will.82 
Article 4A(2)(b) of the Act contains a further exception to the 
general disqualification in article 4A(1), which exception has a 
distinct family protectionism flavor: 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1). . . . 
(b) a person or his spouse who in terms of the law relating 
to intestate succession would have been entitled to inherit 
from the testator if that testator has died intestate shall not 
be thus disqualified to receive a benefit from that will: 
Provided that the value of the benefit which the person 
concerned or his spouse received, shall not exceed the 
value of the share to which that person would have been 
entitled in terms of the law relating to intestate succession. 
This paragraph is a novel addition to the Wills Act. It negates 
the disqualification imposed by article 4A(1), and enables a 
deceased estate’s executor to effect distribution to the testator’s 
otherwise-disqualified family members despite their involvement 
in the making or execution of a will. The executor can do so purely 
on the basis that they are the testator’s intestate heirs; however, 
they will receive no more than their intestate shares from the 
deceased’s estate. Significantly, the executor can act independently 
in this regard;83 alternatively, the Master of the High Court, a 
 82. See In re Estate Barrable 1913 CPD 364 368 and Smith v. Clarkson 
1925 AD 501 503-504, regarding the corresponding common law position. 
 83. DE WAAL & SCHOEMAN-MALAN, supra note 69, at 124. 
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judicial officer charged with aspects of the administration of 
justice, will make a determination.84 Therefore, unlike the 
exception contained in article 4A(2)(a), no court order is required 
for the executor to effect distribution to the family members 
mentioned.85 
Paragraph (b) has been described as the “central provision” in 
article 4A(2),86 and effects legislative ring-fencing of at least an 
intestate share of a deceased’s estate in favor of the testator’s 
spouse and consanguineous relatives. This occurs regardless of 
their involvement in the making or execution of a will, and 
notwithstanding the possibility that they might have unduly 
influenced the testator during those processes. Moreover, the South 
African Supreme Court of Appeal held in Blom v. Brown that the 
availability of the relief under article 4A(2)(a) based on the 
absence of fraud or undue influence is not dependent on the 
inapplicability of the intestate-inheritance-exception of article 
4A(2)(b). The court opined that the legislature did not intend for a 
testator’s spouse or consanguineous relatives to rely solely on 
article 4A(2)(b), without recourse to article 4A(2)(a), in order to 
escape the disqualification imposed under article 4A(1).87 
In this light, the statutory attention given to undue influence in 
the Wills Act, although confined to the narrow aspect of 
participation in the making or execution of wills, conforms to the 
familial solidarity paradigm insofar as paragraph (b)—the central 
provision in article 4A(2)—ensures ex lege wealth retention (albeit 
limited to shares on intestacy) by a testator’s spouse and 
consanguineous relatives who participated in the making or 
execution of a will. Moreover, the Blom judgment confirms that 
these persons are free also to invoke the broader protection 
 84. Mohamed Paleker, Capacity to Inherit in THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 111 (Juanita Jamneck & Christa Rautenbach eds., Oxford Univ. 
Press Southern Africa 2009). 
 85. Blom v. Brown [2011] 3 All SA 223 (SCA) § 19. 
 86. Paleker, supra note 84, at 111. 
 87. Blom, supra note 85, at § 19, § 20. 
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afforded by article 4A(2)(a) in order to escape the legislative 
limitation regarding the award of intestate shares. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the Wills Act’s engagement with 
testamentary undue influence yields familial wealth protection as a 
consequence, particularly insofar as a testator’s surviving spouse 
and biological family members are protected against wealth loss. 
D. South African Testamentary Undue Influence Case Law 
In order to determine whether South African courts’ 
engagement with testamentary undue influence is susceptible to 
criticism similar to that raised against the testamentary undue 
influence doctrine’s application in the United States, it is useful to 
restate four principal assertions regarding the undue influence 
paradox and complexities associated with testamentary undue 
influence gleaned from American scholarly critique of the 
doctrine:88 
1) Courts hail the undue influence doctrine as protective of 
testamentary freedom, but utilize it in an unorthodox manner to 
negate that very freedom by quashing prima facie unnatural 
bequests (bequests under which outsiders benefit to the exclusion 
of a testator’s surviving spouse and (close) consanguineous 
relatives) (hereinafter “the first assertion”); 
2) The courts’ unorthodox use of testamentary undue influence 
can be explained by a judicial pursuit of wealth preservation for a 
testator’s surviving spouse and (close) consanguineous relatives, 
thereby protecting them against disinheritance (hereinafter “the 
second assertion”); 
3) Courts in jurisdictions where inheritance systems recognize 
economic familial solidarity through the operation of family 
protection devices are less inclined to use testamentary undue 
influence to achieve this goal of wealth retention (hereinafter “the 
third assertion”); and 
 88. See supra Parts III.A & B. 
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4) Other inheritance law doctrines and constructs such as 
testamentary capacity, fraud, and coercion ensure that testamentary 
dispositions are made validly and freely, thus rendering the undue 
influence doctrine superfluous (hereinafter “the fourth assertion”). 
It is useful to note that South African courts have found 
testamentary undue influence in only a handful of cases: Executors 
of Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire;89 Kirsten v. Bailey;90 Du Toit v. Van der 
Merwe;91 and Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd.92 can be counted 
among them. The extent to which these cases conform to the 
aforementioned assertions is investigated hereafter by dealing with 
each assertion in turn. 
1. Testamentary Freedom Undermined in Instances of 
Unnatural Bequests 
The “strong rhetoric in support of freedom of testation” that, 
according to Madoff,93 emanates from undue influence judgments 
in the United States, is also apparent in corresponding South 
African case law.94 Does this pro-freedom-of-testation stance hold 
true in instances where South African testators made prima facie 
unnatural bequests to remote relatives or outsiders to the exclusion 
of spouses and/or close consanguineous relatives? Two of the 
abovementioned four South African cases were indeed decided in 
favor of testators’ family members who challenged wills. In 
 89. Cerfonteyn, supra note 61. 
 90. Kirsten v. Bailey 1976 (4) SA 108 (C). 
 91. Du Toit v. Van der Merwe [2000] JOL 5920 (NC). 
 92. Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd. [2010] ZAWCHC 117 (28 April 2010) 
[unreported judgment, accessible at http://www.saflii.org/cgi-bin/ 
disp.pl?file=za/cases/ZAWCHC/2010/117.html&query=longfellow (last visited 
on March 11, 2014)]. 
 93. See supra Part III.A. 
 94. E.g., in Tregea v. Godart, supra note 63, at 22, the court typified undue 
influence as an “encroachment upon the freedom of the testator”, and in Thirion 
v. The Master 2001 (4) SA 1078 (T) 1091I, the court cautioned that one is free 
to dispose of one’s property even in an unreasonable manner, but that the law 
does not permit undue attempts by exploiters to manipulate dying, ill or 
otherwise vulnerable persons. 
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Kirsten v. Bailey95 the successful challengers were the testatrix’s 
sole intestate heirs, and in Du Toit v. Van der Merwe96 the 
testator’s daughters from his first marriage invoked undue 
influence successfully against the testator’s second wife and a non-
consanguineous outsider. On the other hand, in Executors of 
Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire97 the successful challengers were non-
consanguineous outsiders—the executors of the testatrix’s estate, 
and in Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd.98 the court’s finding that the 
applicant exercised undue influence with regard to a formally-
defective will precedent secured the operation of the testatrix’s 
existing will in terms of which her former husband was the sole 
heir. 
Of the aforementioned judgments, only the Kirsten and Du Toit 
cases conform to the first assertion in regard to the undue influence 
paradox. However, the Cerfonteyn case concerned a fairly unique 
scenario99 and, it is submitted, is not instructive on this point. 
Moreover, it will be shown below that the Longfellow court’s 
engagement with undue influence is open to criticism, and it is 
arguable that this case, despite its outcome, in fact supports the 
first assertion. 
In some judgments where undue influence was alleged but not 
found, South African courts have made emphatic pronouncements 
in favor of testamentary freedom. In Thirion v. The Master,100 for 
example, the testator benefited his girlfriend to the exclusion of his 
biological family. She brought an application to have the formally 
non-compliant document that contained her appointment as heir 
condoned under the Wills Act’s condonation (dispensing) 
provision.101 The testator’s mother opposed this application on the 
 95. Kirsten, supra note 90. 
 96. Du Toit, supra note 91. 
 97. Cerfonteyn, supra note 61. 
 98. Longfellow, supra note 92. 
 99. See infra Part IV.D.2. 
 100. Thirion, supra note 94. 
 101. Art. 2(3) of the Wills Act. 
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ground that the girlfriend had unduly influenced the testator. The 
court found that undue influence did not occur, and Judge Van der 
Westhuizen reasoned: 
The one thing that is apparent is that he wanted to make the 
applicant his heir. Even in his earlier will in which he 
benefited his parents, he made provision for the possibility 
of meeting and marrying his dream wife . . . and that she 
would then receive preference over his parents. . . . It is 
clear that [the testator] did exactly what he intended to do 
with fervency. Whether his reasons were sensible and 
morally acceptable to others, and whether it attests to 
immaturity, is beside the point. . . . The law recognizes a 
deceased’s disposition of property, even at the expense of 
others, whether out of respect for death or out of respect for 
the concept of ownership.102 
In this case the testator was party to a confidential relationship 
with the applicant and made a prima facie unnatural bequest (one 
to the exclusion of his biological family) in her favor; moreover, 
no family protection devices were available to his mother (and 
other family members) to secure wealth retention. If ever a court 
was intent on conforming to the first assertion, and on invoking 
undue influence at the expense of freedom of testation to quash the 
disinheritance of consanguineous relatives in order to secure 
familial wealth retention, Thirion’s case provided the ideal 
opportunity to do so. The court nevertheless ruled, notwithstanding 
the testator’s non-conforming dispositive plan, that undue 
influence did not occur.103 
 102. Thirion, supra note 94, at 1095H-1096A (author’s translation from the 
original Afrikaans). 
 103. A similar approach was followed in the earlier case of Finucane, supra 
note 59, where a testatrix benefited the defendant—her attorney—to the 
exclusion of her biological family and her adopted son. The court ruled that 
“however extraordinary it may seem that [the testatrix] should have passed over 
her relatives and adopted son for MacDonald . . . the Court cannot deduce from 
that that MacDonald exercised undue influence over her and that it was by 
means of the exercise of such influence that he obtained the benefit under the 
will.” Id. at 35-36. 
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In Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd.,104 on the other hand, the 
testatrix made a natural bequest (one in favor of a close relative 
and, according to American scholarship, usually a strong indicator 
of the absence of undue influence) to the applicant, her second 
husband, in a will precedent completed by the applicant and, 
according to his evidence, approved by the testatrix. The court 
found that the applicant had unduly influenced the testatrix. 
Therefore, this natural bequest yielded before the court’s view on 
the applicant’s exploitation of his confidential relationship with the 
testatrix. As a result, the testatrix’s existing will, in terms of which 
her first husband was the sole heir, remained intact. But the 
Longfellow court’s undue influence ruling is suspect because the 
facts before the court showed that the testatrix and the applicant 
were ostensibly happily married for more than a decade; the 
applicant called on a commercial bank for assistance in drafting the 
testatrix’s will, and only when the bank failed to respond, did he 
resort to the will precedent. Furthermore, two persons (the 
testatrix’s nurse as well as a colleague of hers) were present when 
the will precedent was completed, and two weeks had elapsed 
between the completion of the will precedent and the testatrix’s 
death. This was sufficient time for her, although terminally ill, to 
express a change of heart in another will. When these facts are 
measured against the test for undue influence in South African law 
laid down in Spies v. Smith, it is certainly arguable that the court 
erred in its finding that the applicant had unduly influenced the 
testatrix. It seems highly probable that the testatrix in fact intended 
to benefit her (second) husband.105 In this light, it is submitted that 
Longfellow, despite its outcome, supports the assertion that 
findings of testamentary undue influence can occasion, in South 
 104. Longfellow, supra note 92. 
 105. See A. van der Linde, Longfellow v BOE Trust Ltd NO (13591/2008) 
[2010] ZAWCHC 117, Mabika v Mabika [2011] ZAGPJHC 109, Taylor v 
Taylor [2011] ZAECPEHC 48: Requirements in terms of section 2(3) of the 
Wills Act 7 of 1953: Some comments on judgments in recent case law, 45 DE 
JURE 412, 417 (2012). 
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Africa as in the United States, the negation of testamentary 
freedom. 
The above exposition shows that, generally, South African 
cases in which wills were challenged successfully on the ground of 
testamentary undue influence secured wealth for testators’ 
consanguineous relatives, thus protecting them from 
disinheritance. However, in Thirion v. The Master106 the court 
rejected an averment of undue influence and upheld a non-
conforming bequest to an outsider with emphatic reliance on 
testamentary freedom. The Thirion court’s pro-freedom-of-
testation stance is, however, undermined by the Longfellow court’s 
negation of testamentary freedom where, as it was argued above, it 
erroneously found that undue influence was present based on the 
facts at hand. 
In light of this mixed picture, the next two assertions regarding 
the undue influence paradox and its associated complexities 
require investigation: were the South African judgments in which 
testamentary undue influence was found motivated primarily by 
the judicial pursuit of familial wealth retention? And does the 
availability of family protection devices in South African law 
nullify the (potential) unorthodox use of testamentary undue 
influence? 
2. Familial Wealth Retention 
The second assertion posits the unorthodox judicial utilization 
of testamentary undue influence as a means to secure wealth 
retention by a testator’s spouse and/or consanguineous relatives 
through the negation of wealth acquisition at their expense by 
either the influencer or by a third-party outsider. The South 
African judgment in Executors of Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire107 is 
somewhat of an enigma on this point. The court opined that “[t]he 
 106. Thirion, supra note 94. 
 107. Cerfonteyn, supra note 61. 
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nature or quality of the object sought to be attained by the use of 
the influence does not guide the decision of the Court. The 
‘undueness’. . . of the influence is in the use of it.”108 This 
observation is appropriate in light of the Cerfonteyn case’s unique 
feature—the fact that the influencer was wholly disinterested. In 
this case it was alleged that the defendant, a Roman Catholic priest 
who was the testatrix’s spiritual adviser and who received no 
benefit under her will, unduly influenced the testatrix to execute a 
codicil in which he was appointed as guardian and tutor of the 
testatrix’s minor children. Judge Fitzpatrick said: 
I have searched every law book to which I have access, and 
have not been able to find one case like the present, where 
the person charged with having exercised undue influence 
to procure the execution of a will had not a personal 
interest of one shilling in the transaction, and did not gain 
one farthing as the result of his influence. 109 
A two-judge majority held, the absence of personal gain on the 
defendant’s part notwithstanding, that undue influence was present 
insofar as the “persistent importunity of the defendant, continued 
for years and culminating on the morning of the death” defeated 
the testatrix’s resistance and occasioned the execution of the 
disputed codicil.110 Therefore, the peculiar Cerfonteyn judgment 
refutes the second assertion insofar as the court’s finding that 
undue influence was present did not negate financial gain by the 
influencer, nor did it prevent wealth loss for, or disinheritance of, 
the testatrix’s consanguineous relatives. 
The judgment in Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd.111 also does not 
fit the familial wealth retention paradigm. The undue influence 
ruling against the testatrix’s second husband of twelve years in this 
case secured operation of the testatrix’s will, in terms of which her 
first husband was the sole heir. Familial wealth retention was 
 108. Id. at 73. 
 109. Id. at 79. 
 110. Id. at 74. 
 111. Longfellow, supra note 92. 
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clearly not achieved through this ruling. However, it was argued 
earlier112 that the Longfellow case is susceptible to criticism; and, 
as it will be shown later,113 the undue influence rulings in both 
Cerfornteyn and Longfellow were secondary to other grounds of 
invalidity of the respective documents. 
Du Toit v. Van der Merwe114 stands alone among the four 
South African undue influence judgments under discussion in that 
the challenge of the will in this case was decided on the common 
law ground of testamentary undue influence alone (the plaintiffs 
abandoned lack of testamentary capacity as an alternative ground 
for the challenge). The challengers were the testator’s three 
daughters, while the will’s principal proponent—the first 
defendant—was the testator’s second wife, to whom he was 
married for more than a decade prior to his death. The testator, 
seventy-nine years of age and in poor health, executed the disputed 
will seventeen days after having made a will in which his 
daughters were appointed as his sole heirs. In the disputed will, the 
testator appointed W—the second defendant—as legatee in respect 
of, among others, the testator’s farm, and designated the first 
defendant as sole heir to the estate residue. 
The court noted the history of discord between the plaintiffs 
and the first defendant, which arose primarily because the first 
defendant convinced the testator that his daughters were not his 
biological children.115 The court further opined that the first 
defendant and W were unreliable witnesses and that their evidence 
was fraught with lies.116 As a result, it held that the evidence 
pointed strongly to the conclusion that the disputed will came 
about through the first defendant’s and W’s undue influence of the 
testator, and that the will had to be set aside.117 
 112. See supra Part IV.D.1.  
 113. See infra Part IV.D.4. 
 114. Du Toit, supra note 91. 
 115. Id. at 47, 59. 
 116. Id. at 50. 
 117. Id. at 54. 
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The bequests in this case conform partly to the confidential 
relationship/natural bequest dichotomy. The legacy of the farm to 
W corresponds to the dichotomy in that a confidential relationship 
of sorts existed between the testator and W (W was the lessee of 
the testator’s farm for some years prior to the latter’s death), while 
the legacy to W was not a natural bequest (W was not a 
consanguineous relative of the testator), thus raising the suspicion 
that the testator might have acted under undue influence with 
regard to the legacy of the farm. On the other hand, the natural 
bequest to the first defendant as the testator’s wife of more than ten 
years, presented in American scholarship as a strong indicator of 
the absence of undue influence, yielded before the court’s view on 
the confidential and exploitive relationship that existed between 
the first defendant and the testator. 
The Du Toit judgment conforms to the second assertion with 
regard to the undue influence paradox insofar as the court attached 
particular weight to evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs 
that the testator would never have contemplated the disinheritance 
of his daughters; particularly not to let the farm fall into an 
outsider’s (W’s) hands.118 The judgment leaves the distinct 
impression that the court was very concerned with the harm caused 
by the daughters’ loss of the family estate. Judge President 
Steenkamp opined, for example, that W had forsaken a legal duty 
that rested on him to correct the testator’s misperceptions 
regarding his daughters, and said: 
In this case the inference can be drawn against [W] that . . . 
[W] should have realized that the deceased, by reason of 
the misperception, was going to disinherit his children and 
would nominate him [W] . . . and first defendant as heirs of 
his estate. The plaintiffs were consequently prejudiced and 
he [W] and first defendant benefited from the 
misperception.119 
 118. Id. at 13, 45. 
 119. Id. at 54 (author’s translation from the original Afrikaans; emphasis 
added). 
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This judgment, one of only a handful of South African cases in 
which testamentary undue influence was established and the only 
one in which the challenge to the will was decided on undue 
influence alone, fits the familial wealth retention paradigm. It 
raises the question, however, whether the dearth of South African 
judgments in which testamentary undue influence was invoked 
successfully is attributable to the presence of family protection 
devices as stated in the third assertion. 
3. Family Protection Devices Curtail the Unorthodox Use of 
Testamentary Undue Influence 
The undue influence ruling in Executors of Cerfonteyn v. 
O’Haire120 was handed down prior to the statutory abolition of 
Roman-Dutch law’s forced heirship devices in the erstwhile Cape 
Colony—at a time, therefore, when family protectionism was 
particularly potent. Cerfonteyn seemingly disproves the assertion 
that the availability of family protection devices decreases judicial 
utilization of undue influence to achieve family protectionism. 
However, given the disinterestedness of the influencer in this 
case,121 it is submitted that the Cerfonteyn judgment is not 
instructive on this point. The undue influence ruling in Kirsten v. 
Bailey122 was handed down at a time when only a testator’s 
children enjoyed maintenance-based protection against 
disinheritance under South African law. In this case, the undue 
influence ruling favored the testatrix’s only intestate heirs who, 
significantly, were not her own children but those of her brother, 
thus not claimants under the common law maintenance 
dispensation. Therefore, Kirsten’s case conforms to the third 
assertion in regard to the undue influence paradox insofar as the 
ruling that undue influence was present secured wealth on 
intestacy for the testatrix’s only consanguineous relatives, who not 
 120. Cerfonteyn, supra note 61. 
 121. See supra Part IV.D.2.  
 122. Kirsten, supra note 90. 
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only fell outside the ambit of existing family protection devices but 
who were also disinherited under the disputed wills. 
Du Toit v. Van der Merwe123 also supports the third assertion, 
if evaluated from the perspective of the court’s ruling in favor of 
the successful challengers of the will. The plaintiffs were the adult 
daughters of the testator, born from his first marriage. They had no 
recourse to the common law maintenance dispensation for 
dependent minor children and were, moreover, disinherited under 
the disputed will. The undue influence ruling in their favor 
undeniably procured wealth for them through the reinstatement of 
the first will under which they were the testator’s sole heirs. 
The judgment in Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd.,124 on the other 
hand, does not conform to assertion three—it was handed down 
after the enactment of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 
which allowed the applicant, if he met the prescribed criteria, a 
maintenance claim against his deceased wife’s estate (the judgment 
is silent, however, on whether he instituted such a claim). The 
court nevertheless made an undue influence ruling against the 
testatrix’s husband and the potential availability of a family 
protection device did not deter the court from ruling that the 
husband unduly influenced the testatrix. 
South African judgments in which testamentary undue 
influence was alleged but not found, paint a different picture. The 
challengers of the wills in these judgments were, for the greater 
part, not claimants under any maintenance dispensation and were, 
therefore, without recourse to family protection devices as means 
of procuring wealth from the estates of the allegedly unduly 
influenced testators.125 Yet, the challenges of the wills were not 
successful. In some of these cases, the unsuccessful challengers 
 123. Du Toit, supra note 91. 
 124. Longfellow, supra note 92. 
 125. E.g., Finucane, supra note 59 (challenger of the will was the testatrix’s 
adult child); Spies, supra note 68 (challenger of the will was the testator’s 
stepmother, on behalf of the testator’s minor half-sister); Katz v. Katz [2004] 4 
All SA 545 (C) (challengers of the will were the testator’s adult children). 
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were indeed heirs under earlier wills, but they still could not 
procure findings that undue influence was present with respect to 
the disputed wills (which findings would have secured the 
operation of such earlier wills in their favor).126 Evidently, neither 
the unavailability of family protection devices, nor the 
procurement of wealth through earlier wills swayed courts in favor 
of undue influence rulings in these cases. South African judgments 
are, therefore, dichotomous with respect to the third assertion. 
Judgments in which testamentary undue influence was found 
conform, by and large, to the third assertion; however, judgments 
in which testamentary undue influence was not found generally left 
the unsuccessful challengers of the wills without recourse to family 
protection devices as a means of wealth procurement. 
4. Secondary Undue Influence Findings Are Superfluous 
South African testamentary undue influence judgments 
conform, by and large, to the fourth assertion. In Executors of 
Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire127 the two-judge majority found, first, that 
the testatrix, by reason of pulmonary consumption (tuberculosis) 
and the taking of opiates, lacked testamentary capacity. Clearly, 
the case should have rested there. Both judges nevertheless 
proceeded to a secondary undue influence inquiry, probably 
because it was pleaded in the alternative. Similarly, in Kirsten v. 
Bailey128 the plaintiffs pleaded lack of testamentary capacity on the 
testatrix’s part, and undue influence in the alternative, in regard to 
three wills made by the testatrix shortly before her death. The court 
held that the testatrix lacked the requisite capacity when she made 
each of the three wills and, as a result, set all three wills aside.129 
The court ruled, moreover, that the first and third wills were “in 
any event obtained as a result of undue influence exerted upon the 
 126. E.g., Finucane, supra note 59; Spies, supra note 68. 
 127. Cerfonteyn, supra note 61. 
 128. Kirsten, supra note 90. 
 129. Id. at 111. 
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testatrix by the first defendant [the sole heir in terms of both these 
wills] and that they could, for this reason also, be set aside.”130 
Evidently, this finding was secondary to the capacity ruling and, 
again, superfluous. As in Cerfonteyn, the case should have rested 
with the capacity ruling. 
This tendency persisted in Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd.,131 
where the court ruled that a will precedent completed by the 
applicant did not comply with the Wills Act’s formal requirements, 
and could not be rescued under the Wills Act’s condonation 
(dispensing) provision.132 The court, having made this ruling, 
proceeded to an undue influence ruling on synoptic evidence 
regarding the testatrix’s physical and mental state, and did so in 
two meager paragraphs of the judgment.133 Such a secondary 
finding typecasts testamentary undue influence as the “safety 
valve” that Spivack bemoans134—Judge Baartman admitted in 
Longfellow that she made the undue influence finding to allow for 
the possibility that she was wrong on the condonation ruling135—
and fortifies the conclusion that South African undue influence 
judgments conform, by and large, to the fourth assertion. 
A survey of case law reveals that South African courts opt 
frequently to resolve challenges to wills where undue influence is 
averred (invariably as one among a number of alternatives) on 
grounds other than undue influence. The Cerfonteyn and Kirsten 
cases show that testators’ lack of testamentary capacity is the 
alternative ground on which such judgments are most commonly 
based. In another case, the court concluded that testamentary 
undue influence did not occur, but ruled that the alleged influencer 
was unworthy to inherit by reason of reprehensible conduct 
towards the testatrix, which disqualified him from testamentary 
 130. Id. at 111, 113. 
 131. Longfellow, supra note 92. 
 132. Id. at § 24. 
 133. Id. at § 29-§ 30. 
 134. See supra Part III.B. 
 135. Longfellow, supra note 92, at § 29. 
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benefit.136 This state of affairs leads one to conclude that in South 
Africa, contrary to the position in the United States, testamentary 
undue influence is readily averred or pleaded, but, certainly 
because of evidentiary difficulties of meeting the burden of proof, 
it is very difficult to procure a ruling that undue influence was in 
fact perpetrated.137 It is submitted, therefore, that South African 
courts generally underplay pleas of testamentary undue influence 
in challenges to wills, thus conforming, by and large, to the fourth 
assertion insofar as testamentary undue influence is frequently 
displaced by other inheritance rules or statutory prescripts. 
V. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
The exposition in Part IV of this article on testamentary undue 
influence in South Africa showed that some points of contact exist 
between the South African legislature’s and courts’ engagement 
with this aspect of the law of wills, on the one hand, and issues 
raised in scholarly criticism of the testamentary undue influence 
doctrine in the United States, on the other hand. Do these 
similarities warrant the conclusion that the undue influence 
paradox and the American doctrine’s associated complexities are 
manifest in the South African law of wills? And, even if this 
question is answered in the negative, can South Africa learn some 
lessons from scholars’ critical appraisal of testamentary undue 
influence in the American context? 
The South African Wills Act’s engagement with testamentary 
undue influence, although limited, yields family protectionism 
through article 4A(2)(b)’s138 ring-fencing of wealth in favor of a 
testator’s intestate heirs. It is certainly arguable that article 
 136. Taylor, supra note 65. 
 137. Roger Kerridge, Wills Made in Suspicious Circumstances: The Problem 
of the Vulnerable Testator, 59 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 310, 328 (2000), laments a 
similar state of affairs in England when he argues that “it is too easy in England 
to coerce, or deceive, a vulnerable testator into making a will and it is not easy 
enough to challenge a suspicious will when one comes to light.” 
 138. See supra Part IV.C.  
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4A(2)(b) functions as a family protection device in South African 
inheritance law, alongside the devices highlighted in Part IV.A of 
this article. Critics of the testamentary undue influence doctrine in 
the United States will undoubtedly register their lack of surprise at 
the fact that South African courts have issued very few orders in 
favor of testators’ consanguineous relatives under article 4A(2)(a). 
Evidently, article 4A(2)(b) protects these relatives adequately 
against wealth loss; consequently they need not resort to court 
orders under article 4A(2)(a) to secure wealth on the ground that 
they had not perpetrated undue influence when testators made or 
executed their wills. It is submitted, therefore, that the South 
African legislature’s limited engagement with testamentary undue 
influence in the Wills Act conforms generally to the familial 
economic solidarity paradigm that underpins the undue influence 
paradox in the American context. 
South African courts’ use of testamentary undue influence also 
conforms to elements of the paradox and assertions made with 
regard to the testamentary undue influence doctrine in the United 
States. Significantly, such conformity is manifest in Du Toit v. Van 
der Merwe,139 a case in which the challenge of the will was 
decided on undue influence alone, and especially insofar as the Du 
Toit court, in its reasoning on the presence of undue influence, 
voiced concern regarding wealth loss by the testator’s disinherited 
daughters. 
It is submitted, however, that, notwithstanding the South 
African legislature’s aforementioned stance in favor of familial 
solidarity, it is difficult to conclude from the judgments surveyed 
in Part IV of this article that South African courts are driven 
primarily by family protectionism in their engagement with 
testamentary undue influence. Even in Du Toit the undue influence 
ruling was a two-edged sword: the finding of undue influence 
made against the testator’s wife indeed prevented wealth loss by 
 139. Du Toit, supra note 91. 
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the testator’s daughters through their disinheritance under the 
disputed will, but denied the wife wealth in spite of her spousal 
status (of more than a decade) and of the natural character of the 
bequest to her. 
In this light, the first lesson that South Africa must learn from 
scholarly criticism of the testamentary undue influence doctrine in 
the United States is that testamentary undue influence lends itself 
to unorthodox usage that can contort it into a mechanism for 
familial wealth retention at the expense of its role as guardian of 
testamentary freedom. It cannot be said definitively that South 
African courts have followed their American counterparts into 
what its critics find to be testamentary undue influence’s 
paradoxical trap. Nevertheless, South African judgments in which 
testamentary undue influence was found to have been present were 
generally decided in favor of consanguineous relatives who were 
disinherited under the disputed wills, and who were, moreover, 
without recourse to family protection devices to secure wealth 
retention. The broad contours of a familial economic solidarity 
paradigm are, therefore, detectable in South African courts’ 
engagement with testamentary undue influence. Consequently, it is 
imperative for these courts to be alerted to the dangers associated 
with the unorthodox and paradoxical judicial utilization of undue 
influence in the law of wills. 
The second lesson that South Africa must learn from American 
scholars’ criticism of the testamentary undue influence doctrine’s 
operation in the United States concerns the necessity of affirming 
testamentary undue influence in its role as guardian of 
testamentary freedom. Regrettably, South African courts’ 
engagement with testamentary undue influence has not 
consistently reinforced this truism. On the one hand, a judgment 
such as Thirion v. The Master140 should satisfy all but the fiercest 
critics of the undue influence doctrine in the United States: in this 
 140. Thirion, supra note 94. 
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case the court rejected a claim of undue influence and upheld a 
bequest to a non-consanguineous outsider; moreover, it founded its 
ruling on a firm adherence to testamentary freedom, even with 
regard to the non-confirming dispositive plan that excluded the 
testator’s biological family. On the other hand, scholars who are 
critical of the way the undue influence doctrine operates in the 
United States may share the view that in Longfellow v. BOE Trust 
Ltd.,141 the court’s ruling that testamentary undue influence was 
present was artificial on the facts at hand and indeed negated the 
testatrix’s testamentary freedom in that case. The Longfellow 
judgment shows that South African courts are not immune to 
derogating from freedom of testation through ill-conceived 
findings of testamentary undue influence. 
The third lesson that South Africa must learn from the criticism 
of the testamentary undue influence doctrine in American 
scholarship concerns the condemnation of undue influence to a 
subsidiary role in challenges of wills. South African courts have 
made secondary, often superfluous, testamentary undue influence 
rulings in the past which, as Spivack points out,142 cast 
testamentary undue influence in the role of a mere “safety valve”. 
This unfortunate tendency is exacerbated in South African law by 
the fact that it is apparently difficult for the challengers of wills to 
prove that undue influence was in fact perpetrated. Placing the 
onus exclusively on the plaintiff throughout may lie at the heart of 
this problem. 
How can this situation be remedied? The American experience 
suggests burden-shifting as a possible solution. Although burden-
shifting does not accord with the South African common law 
position on testamentary undue influence, the South African 
legislature can decree a departure from the common law. Some 
South African scholars have called for burden-shifting in 
challenges of wills in the past. For example, Sonnekus proposed 
 141. Longfellow, supra note 92. 
 142. See supra Part III.B.  
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that the South African legislature should amend the Wills Act’s 
provision on testamentary capacity by placing the burden of proof 
on the wills’ proponents in challenges of wills based on lack of 
capacity if such wills were executed after the testators attained a 
statutorily-determined age.143 In this light, it must be noted that the 
South African judgments in which testamentary undue influence 
was found to have been present concerned mostly testators who 
were of advanced age. Building on Sonnekus’s suggestion, the 
Wills Act’s testamentary capacity provision could be amended also 
in the sense of placing the burden of proving the absence of undue 
influence on wills’ proponents in all undue influence challenges 
where testators exceeded, at the time of the wills’ execution, a 
statutorily-determined age. The introduction of such an age-based 
rule to regulate burden placement is, arguably, preferable to a 
“confidential relationship rule” or a “suspicious circumstances 
rule” because an age-based rule would not violate the South 
African common law’s firm stance that a special relationship or 
suspicious circumstances do not in themselves raise a presumption 
of undue influence. 
Manipulating burden placement in challenges of wills may, 
however, not be acceptable to South African law reformers. It is 
submitted that, in the alternative, Spivack’s assertion that 
prevention is better than cure points the way for possible South 
African legal development: ante mortem mechanisms should be 
instituted to ensure the valid and free expression of testamentary 
wishes.144 Again, South African scholars have proffered solutions 
akin to those advocated in American scholarship to achieve this 
goal.145 But perhaps an answer lies in South Africa’s common law 
 143. Jean C. Sonnekus, Testeerbevoegdheid en Testeervryheid as 
Grondwetlik Beskermde Bates (1), 75 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-
HOLLANDSE REG 1 (2012). Sonnekus proposes seventy-five years of age as 
appropriate to this end. 
 144. See supra Part III.B. 
 145. E.g., Jean C. Sonnekus, Freedom of Testation and the Ageing Testator, 
supra note 6, at 88, who advocates for the amendment of the South African 
Wills Act to require every witness to a will to supplement the attesting signature 
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insofar as the notarial will was, until its abolition under the current 
Wills Act, a recognized Roman-Dutch will form. The common law 
notarial will required the involvement of a notary, either as will 
drafter or to confirm a will as expressing freely a testator’s final 
wishes. It is submitted that a statutory reintroduction of the notarial 
will, particularly if made compulsory in regard to testators who 
have attained a statutorily-fixed age and/or in regard to wills made 
in institutions for the mentally and/or physically infirm, would be 
an important safeguard for South African testators’ free expression 
of wishes. 
The foregoing proposals suggest that the South African legal 
position on capacity-related and undue influence challenges of 
wills can be enhanced through relatively simple law reform. And 
herein lies, arguably, the greatest lesson that South Africa must 
learn from scholarly critique of the testamentary undue influence 
doctrine in the United States: South African scholars have 
subjected the South African law on testamentary undue influence 
to analysis and criticism only infrequently. American scholars, on 
the other hand, have highlighted the shortcomings of the 
testamentary undue influence doctrine in their legal system in a 
sustained manner, and at least one scholar called for the abolition 
of the doctrine in the United States.146 South African scholarship 
has, for the most part, shied away from a critical appraisal of undue 
influence in the South African law of wills. While the rules 
pertaining to testamentary undue influence are integral to South 
African testamentary succession, these rules can certainly be 
with full disclosure of identity in order to allow such witnesses to be traced and 
questioned with regard to the circumstances of the will’s execution. Sonnekus 
(id. at 95) also proposes that the South African legislature should introduce 
statutory prescripts that permit an officer of the court to execute a will on behalf 
of a mentally infirm testator. See also Jean C. Sonnekus, Testeerbevoegdheid, 
Herroeping van ‘n Testament en Kuratele Sorg, 15 STELL. L. REV. 450 (2004). 
François du Toit, Mental Capacity as an Element of Testamentary Capacity, 122 
S. AFRICAN L. J. 661 (2005), calls for the involvement of a testator’s attending 
physician or psychologist to confirm capacity. 
 146. See supra Part III.A. 
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enhanced to provide, as Frolik reasons,147 optimal protection to 
vulnerable testators with marginal capacity. Sustained comparative 
research by South African inheritance law scholars on the way 
testamentary undue influence functions in other jurisdictions will 
contribute significantly to attaining such enhancement. 
 
 147. See supra Part III.B. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
